

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Before the "Truckee Method": Race, Space, and Capital in Truckee's Chinese Community, 1870–1880

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ABSTRACT

Truckee, California is known to historians as the site of a late 19th century campaign to expel Chinese from the town by boycotting their employers. Before the "Truckee Method" of expulsion was implemented, however, Truckee's Chinatown was first isolated from the rest of the town and then physically relocated. This article explores how boundaries between "Chinese space" and "white space" were constructed during this period, as fears that Chinese buildings were especially flammable became the basis for the belief that it was necessary to isolate "Chinese space" from "white space." Although white employers of Chinese workers are often depicted as opposing anti-Chinese racism, we argue that white employers played a crucial role in the process of isolating and relocating Chinatown, drawing on their status and financial resources to determine where Chinese could live, work, and own property in Truckee.

KEYWORDS

Chinese American; Anti-Chinese Movement; Truckee; Chinese Railroad Worker; Race

On October 27th, 1882, Truckee was on fire again. Three different fires had previously swept through the booming California town in 1871. The third, in late July, destroyed nearly all the hotels, saloons, and other businesses on Truckee's "commercial row" on Front Street. Conflagrations raged again in 1873, 1875, 1878, and 1881. The 1882 fire threatened to be as devastating as the 1871 blaze. This time, flames spread rapidly from the west end of Front Street toward the heart of commercial row.[1] W.F. Edwards, then editor of the *Truckee Republican*, later recounted:

> A great scarcity of help occurred just as the fire was at its hottest when the happy thought struck some one to bring over the Chinese and put them at work on the engines. It required but a suggestion to have it carried out. A delegation of men started for Chinatown and brought over by dint of coaxing and driving a good number of celestials, who were at once placed to work on the pumps and kept there till morning. None of the Chinese were spared on account of "quality," the leading merchants being forced to work "allee same," as the rest.[2]

Edwards' description suggests the ambivalent relationship between Truckee's white and Chinese residents, who were both coaxed and driven, or "forced," to work the water pumps through an exhausting night. Just three years earlier, these individuals had been driven out of the Chinatown that lay northwest of the area subsequently consumed by the 1882 fire. The proponents of Chinese displacement and relocation, many of them Front Street business owners, had argued that Chinatown posed a fire hazard for the entire town.

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Now those same individuals were relying on Chinese labor to save their businesses from fire. This must have been a particularly ironic turn of events for longtime merchant Fong Lee. Lee had conspicuously built his store out of brick in order to make it fire-resistant, and he had strenuously opposed the coerced relocation. In front of a gathering of Truckee citizens, Lee had denounced the demand for Chinese relocation as hypocritical: when an "American" house burned down, the victim received financial assistance to rebuild, but when a Chinese person's house burned down, Lee pointed out, the victim was exhorted to move across the river.[3]

Most studies of Truckee's Chinese community focus on the "Truckee Method," the largely successful boycott of companies employing Chinese workers that was organized in 1885 to drive the Chinese out of Truckee and its surrounding areas. As the above snapshot of Truckee demonstrates, however, an examination of the Chinese community's development before the boycott can tell us much about how race, space, and class were deeply interwoven, constraining where Chinese might live, work, and own property in one of California's largest Chinatowns. In this study, we explore how space in Truckee became racialized during the 1870s. We argue that white professionals and business owners, including those who employed Chinese workers, facilitated the anti-Chinese movement's segregation and isolation of the Chinese community in the years prior to the "Truckee Method." Contrary to conventional representations of this group as defenders of the Chinese, these professionals and business owners in Truckee were the crucial actors in developing constraints on where the Chinese might work and live.

Over the course of the 1870s, Chinese and white space each came to be defined in contrast to the other. Beginning in 1875, boundaries between those spaces were intentionally constructed, when the communities had commingled previously. An earlier pattern of development, in which Chinese businesses and residences tended to cluster, but often sat next to or between white-owned businesses and dwellings, was decisively eliminated. As Truckee grew, white space became increasingly differentiated, with distance growing between elite and laboring residences, between commercial and residential areas, and between red-light districts and respectable areas. The confined development of Chinatown – with residences jostling for space alongside businesses of all kinds – generated an image of Chinese space as homogeneous and dangerous. Eventually, even Fong Lee and his fire-resistant brick building would appear threatening to white property owners worried about the possibility of fire leaping from Chinese space to white space.[4]

This account of how Truckee's racial geography was shaped and reshaped raises important questions about the relationship between class and anti-Chinese racism. Most historians have agreed with Michael Goldstein, who argued that anti-Chinese racism was able to gain popular support in Truckee only after the depletion of the Comstock lode led to a decline in demand for lumber and a local economic recession. The resulting economic anxiety fueled white workers' antagonism toward Chinese workers, based on the assumption that Chinese workers unfairly took jobs from whites. Sympathetic – or demagogic – civic leaders, such as the editor of the *Truckee Republican*, Charles McGlashan, channeled this racism into the "Truckee Method," which sought to force the Chinese community to leave Truckee by threatening a boycott of any employer of Chinese labor.[5]

Under this interpretation, the wealthier white owners of lumber and wood mill companies and white employers of Chinese workers are cast as unsuccessful opponents to white working-class racism. There is an obvious aspect of truth to this: in Truckee, both sawmill operator Elle Ellen and lumber company Sisson, Wallace, and Crocker contracted with Chinese businesses even after McGlashan announced his boycott. As historian Sue Fawn Chung writes, “Elle Ellen adamantly refused to yield to the anti-Chinese agitators’ demand.” More generally, major employers of Chinese labor such as Crocker, Hopkins, Huntington, and especially Leland Stanford – “the Big Four” – spoke highly of their Chinese workforce. They had, after all, employed 10,000–12,000 Chinese to build the Central Pacific Railroad (CPRR) and continued to employ large numbers in the 1870s for managing and rebuilding of the CPRR infrastructure.[6]

But in Truckee, there is another side to the story. White business owners and property owners, including lumber and mill company capitalists, worked with the CPRR’s agent to remake Truckee’s geography along racialized lines. They were the ones who most directly structured the spatial relations between the Chinese and whites, because they were the social actors with the resources and networks to raise funds to purchase property and oversee sales and rentals. Believing themselves to be acting in the best interests of the Chinese – even when actual Chinese residents disagreed – their attitude was one of racial paternalism rather than racial animus, and they operated through myriad financial transactions rather than threats of violence. The end result of their work, however, was to translate a presumed racial difference into spatial terms by segregating the Chinese community.

Chinese settlement in Truckee before 1875

The Central Pacific Railroad began commercial operation in 1869. Truckee was the railroad’s first major fueling stop for trains heading east over the Sierra Nevada from Sacramento. Surrounded by forest, Truckee developed a rapidly expanding economy by supplying the CPRR and other locations with wood. In 1868, the lumber mill owned by Joseph Gray and George Schaffer churned out 5 million feet of lumber, while their competitors at the Truckee Lumber Company, owned by E.J. Brickell and George Geisendorf, cut 2 million feet of timber for the railroad.[7]

By 1870, Truckee was bustling: saloons, hotels, and other businesses drew crowds to Front Street, which ran parallel and just north of the train tracks. To the south, River Street ran between the tracks and the Truckee River, parallel to both. Early Truckee had only a few other major streets, with a mix of commercial properties and residences: Bridge Street, Church Street, and Main Street (see Figure 1). Bridge Street ran from the river northwards, crossing River Street, cutting across the railroad tracks, and then intersecting Front Street. It continued north, where it met Church Street. Church Street led east into the neighborhood where the town’s church and school were located. Further north, Bridge Street met East Main Street at an angle. In 1871, Truckee’s red-light district relocated here after a fire, in notable proximity to the Church Street neighborhood. East Main Street eventually connected back to Front Street, where it became West Main Street. The area that lay north of West Main Street – which a visitor could enter by turning down an alley close to the junction of Main Street and Front Street, and then walking uphill – was the location of Chinatown.[8]

In 1870, a visitor to these hillside shops and residences could have tested his or her luck in the games of chance run by the six residents listed as gamblers, visited one of four physicians, a jeweler, a butcher, one of three opium houses, bought small goods from one of two peddlers, produce from one of the gardeners, or purchased daily necessities from one of the several


Church St
Bridge St
Front St
East Main St (Jibboom St)
White and Chinese Businesses
Railroad Line
N
Chinese Wash House
Cary Hotel
Fong Lee
Chinatown
West Main St
Chinese Wash House
Susan Baldwin

Figure 1. A rough, speculative sketch of the major streets in Truckee, CA, ca. 1872, based on information from Marilou West Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records, 3rd edition* (Grass Valley: Marilou West Ficklin, 2003). The authors are not aware of any extant maps of Truckee from that time. Image courtesy of Kayan Cheung-Miaw.



Figure 2. *Sanborn fire insurance map from Truckee, Nevada County, California*. Sanborn Map Company, January 1885. Map. (https://www.loc.gov/item/sanborn00895_001/).

Chinese grocers. Twenty-two women are listed as prostitutes in the census, recorded in three separate dwellings. Ten Chinese individuals listed their occupation as "grocer" in 1870, and according to the census, these individuals held most of the recorded wealth of the Chinese community. Even among these individuals, wealth was concentrated. Merchant Fong Lee reported $8000 in combined real estate and personal wealth, while four other grocers reported a combined $8200 of wealth. Another physician held $700 in personal wealth.[9]

Most of the land in Chinatown was leased from Charles Crocker by Chinese residents. A building known as the China Hotel, however, was owned by Sisson, Wallace, and Co., a major contractor of Chinese labor for the CPRR. It is not clear how Sisson, Wallace, and Co. used the building, but given the location of the property and nature of the company, they may have converted it into housing for contracted Chinese workers. Besides the China Hotel building, laborers, railroad workers, and wood choppers – as many as 233, or nearly 16% of Truckee's entire population in the 1870 census – constructed housing on the hillside and rebuilt after every fire until 1879. The vast majority lived in housing with four or more laborers.[10]

The high number of laborers residing per building resulted from a number of factors. First, there were nearly no heteronormative families in the Chinese community and very few children. Only one Chinese woman was listed in the census as a wife, and she raised a one-year-old California-born son named Colfax, perhaps named after the prominent politician Schuyler Colfax, Jr. While many white laborers, whether immigrant or U.S.-born, lived with other laborers, a large number had families and lived with a wife and children rather than other laborers. Second, there was an economic logic: since most Chinese residences were either in work camps controlled by lumber or sawmill proprietors, or were on land in Chinatown leased from Crocker, higher-density housing would have reduced costs for the capitalist and laborer alike.

While most Chinese settlement occurred in the area described above, not all Chinese residents of Truckee organized their economic or intimate lives around Chinatown, and there was no clear border demarcating Chinese and white areas of Truckee at the time. In 1870, Susan Baldwin lived on the north side of West Main Street, bordered on the west by carpenter William Roberts and on the east by a China Wash House.[11] According to county assessor records, that wash house was likely owned by Hong Lee; although no Hong Lee is listed as a washman in the 1870 census, there is an Ah Hong living with Ah Yen, both washmen. On the other side of Main Street, opposite Baldwin's residence and Hong Lee's establishment, Canadian immigrant Frank Govan and Irish immigrant James Canovan ran a blacksmith shop and may have been frequent customers of Hong Lee's laundry business.[12]

Another wash house bordered the Cary House, a hotel or boarding house on the north side of Front Street operated by the English-Irish duo of Thomas and Mary Cary. The Cary House was situated in close proximity to W.A.G. Brown's saloon. At the time of the census, the Cary House employed a Canadian housekeeper and Chinese cook Ah Sing, and boarded five railroad brakemen, a railroad fireman, and four men listed as laborers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the laundry next to the Cary House was a comparatively large operation. The 1870 census records five Chinese washmen dwelling there: Wan Lee, She Chuck, Ah Cheung, My Hing, and Lee Yup. These washmen lived close to carpenters, miners, and laborers, but also lawyers Pembrook Murray and Frances L. Aud, both of whom reported to the census taker that their personal wealth in excess of $1500.[13]

The employees of these wash houses likely interacted with their white neighbors on a weekly or daily basis, but the laundries themselves were not too far from the section of Main Street where West Main transitioned to East Main, which held a high concentration of Chinese-owned businesses. In addition, one wash house, operated by Ah Jing and Ah Ying, likely set up shop on the town's east end, closer to Church Street where the town's wealthier non-Chinese residents lived and not too far from the residence of one of Truckee's founders, Joseph Gray.[14]

Besides laundry proprietors and employees, Chinese workers earned their living in a variety of settings around Truckee. These included Chinese cooks, who filled stomachs at Chinese work camps and hotels, or were employed by wealthier white families. The Campbell Hotel, owned by Kentuckian W.B. Campbell, employed two cooks, known as Ah Saul and Ah Dick, and a chambermaid, Sing Sam. These three were part of the hotel's multiracial workforce that included two Black hotel porters and a barber named J.R. Holland who is listed as "mulatto." Eight Chinese residents worked as gardeners. Some of these gardeners made the trek east to the flourishing garden that lay just outside Truckee.[15]

Chinese woodchoppers, sawmill workers, and kiln workers toiled at a number of sites on the edges of town or beyond. The Truckee Lumber Company ran its operations just south of the Truckee River, as did Shaffer and Joseph Gray; Elle Ellen operated a mill on the northern edge of town with 15 Chinese workers. The Richardson Brothers started mill operations in 1874 just six miles from Truckee. Sisson, Wallace, and Co. operated approximately 350 kilns to turn wood into charcoal in the Truckee area; in 1874, when charcoal production hit its peak volume, the company employed over 300 Chinese workers to produce thousands of bushels of coal each day.[16]

Although Chinese worked and inhabited a range of spaces throughout Truckee, the densest cluster of Chinese businesses existed along Main Street close to where East and West Main Street met. In 1867, the county assessor records listed seven properties owned by Chinese individuals on the north side of Main Street, and one on the north side of Front Street. In 1868, records show three on the north side of Main Street and one on the street's southern side; one property is at an unlisted location. The year 1870 saw an enormous expansion of Chinese-owned properties. Seven are listed on the north side of Main Street and six on the south side. Two others are listed on the commercial area of North Front Street, and an additional six are listed but without a location. There are also four Chinese-owned properties that are described as bordering other listed properties, but which do not have their own entry.[17]

There were, then, at least 25 properties owned by Chinese in 1870 throughout Truckee, with the majority on Main Street. Several of these properties bordered businesses or houses owned by white residents, indicating a porous zone between Chinese and non-Chinese areas of town. Ye Hang's business was on North Front Street, where most white-owned businesses were located. This may have been the laundry next to the Cary House, although there is no Ye Hang listed in the census. Ye Sung's business was adjacent to the blacksmith James Canovan. Hong Lee's property, as we have seen, was likely the wash house that Susan Baldwin moved in next to in 1868 or 1869. Tang Lee owned property next to a Mr. Burk, which may refer to either Irish blacksmith Luke Burk or Ohio native and livery proprietor M.K. Burk. Hi Young's property was likely the easternmost Chinese business on the south side of Main. It was bordered on its east by W.B. Campbell's stables. Walking down Main Street from northeast to southwest, one would have passed Campbell's stables, and then properties owned by Hi Young, Ah Pawn, Ah How, and Jim Yung, successively.[18]

Up to 1875, Chinese and white properties sat next to each other in many parts of Truckee. Yet, California provided different legal rights to Chinese and white property owners. White families and individuals in Truckee could take advantage of an 1851 California statute to make a homestead declaration. Recording the declaration in county records would, in theory, prevent the family's home and property valued up to $5000 from being forcibly sold as a result of a lawsuit. The basic motivation behind the 1851 statute was to shelter heteronormative families from the turbulent winds of the economy. As Paul Goodman notes, the "homestead exemption reversed the law's priorities to give family security precedence over creditor's rights." This would have made a difference in at least one instance: on August 10, 1872, Fong Lee lost his valuable "fire proof brick house and lot," from which he also ran his business, as a result of a legal procedure initiated by lawyer Pembroke Murray. He had to wait until March 18, 1873, to purchase the land back in a sheriff's sale. Although Goodman notes that the real protection offered by homestead exemptions often did not live up to its promise, the Chinese were excluded from the vision of stable families and communities that undergirded the California statute. The rest of the decade would demonstrate exactly what that meant for Truckee's Chinese residents.[19]

The 1875 fire and its aftermath

During the years 1875–1880, the relationship between race and space in Truckee changed dramatically. Based on their idea that Chinese businesses and dwellings were more susceptible to fire than areas with white-owned properties, Truckee's white property owners reshaped downtown in order to differentiate and separate Chinese and white spaces. This process involved the creation of physical boundaries to define and isolate Chinese space, as well as restrictions on where Chinese could rent or own buildings for residential or commercial purposes.

On May 29, 1875, an early morning fire consumed nearly all Chinese-owned properties along with several white-owned businesses on Front Street. An enormous amount of Chinese merchant wealth disintegrated in the blaze. Hi Chung and Qin Ling Lung each reported losses of $2000. Me Hong lost $1500, Ah Chow lost $800, while four merchants – Gee Sing, Ah Look, Wing Choi, and Ah Mou – lost $1000 in the fire. Loon, Tung, Cheong and Co. reported the largest loss by far, a staggering $30,000. Five properties on Front Street held by white business owners, including Sisson, Wallace, and Co., also suffered losses totaling $5000.[20]

A meeting of white property owners "who ha[d] long felt an interest in a better safeguard against fire" soon proposed to displace and relocate the Chinese across the Truckee River, adding that the Chinese "seemed willing to remove, provided a good title can be obtained and the land bought at reasonable rates." Chinatown's land must have been desirable, since the *Truckee Republican* noted "People stand ready to take the lots now owned by them [the Chinese]." But this plan ran into roadblocks. Chinatown residents had already paid the CPRR's Town Site Agent, D.H. Haskell, rent for the year, and Haskell apparently demanded prices for the real estate beyond what white residents were willing to pay.[21]

Instead of relocating them, Truckee's white property owners decided to isolate the Chinese and make it onerous for them to reside in close proximity to white-owned buildings. They began by planning the construction of wide roads to define Chinatown's east and west boundaries, allowing Chinese to rebuild on the hillside only between those roads, Main Street on the south, and High Street at the top of the hill on the north. "The plan," the *Truckee Republican* reported, "is to have no more Chinese houses built on Second Street [East Main Street], below this street, and to have none built on the south side of the street at all."[22]

In seeking to create a physical barrier between Chinatown and space primarily occupied by whites, white property owners imputed to Chinese space a special sense of danger and susceptibility to fire. This reflected a more general preoccupation that white Californians had with Chinese buildings. As D. Michael Bottoms has argued, 1880s San Francisco ordinances targeting Chinese laundries emerged from the sense that "Chinese washhouses" were "firetraps that represented a danger to the entire city." The San Francisco "laundry wars" that led to the *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* Supreme Court case were an effort to protect the white, middle-class spaces of San Francisco from Chinese buildings and the risk of fire they purportedly represented. In this regard, they echoed the campaign to isolate and segregate the Chinese in Truckee.[23]

A typical description of Truckee's Chinatown after 1875 was one that W.F. Edwards later provided: "Whoever has seen a Chinatown knows that they are but a lot of packing boxes stored together, and that a fire once started is uncontrollable, and insures the almost certain destruction of all contiguous buildings." Edwards apparently felt he could describe not just Truckee's Chinatown, but any Chinatown, as particularly flammable. Descriptions of this kind may have contained a kernel of truth: Chinatown dwellings were more likely to be made of wood, as it was a cheap building material. However, what observers faulted Truckee's Chinatown for was true of much of Truckee during this period. As Lord notes, the town was full of "ramshackle wooden buildings standing close together, often near to the wood products and byproducts of lumber mills [and] offered great opportunity for fires to start with even the inadvertent spark off a braking train's wheels."[24]

Be that as it may, D.H. Haskell agreed to work with the white residents to construct the roads. The 96-feet-wide street was to start "17 feet east of the stone building known as Fong Lee and Co.'s store […] nearly the entire ground included in the proposed street is donated to the town by Mr. Haskell." And in order to ensure that the street would define a real boundary between Chinese and white space, Haskell also agreed "not to sell or rent any of the lots on Main street east of the newly laid out street that are now vacant, to any Chinaman, for any purpose." The final clause of this sentence indicated that Chinese businesses, no less than Chinese homes, were subject to the strictures of Truckee's new racial geography.[25]

The white residents of Truckee who led this effort were not the woodchoppers or millworkers that would later fear and resent what they saw as economic competition from Chinese labor. On the contrary, those most active in constraining the location of Chinese residences were professionals and business owners. Their rhetoric proclaimed a fear that their homes, offices, or commercial buildings would be destroyed by fire if not properly insulated from Chinese space. The initial gathering of property owners met in a building owned by Capitol Saloon proprietor W.H. Hurd. That gathering nominated a committee to implement the isolation and relocation proposal, consisting of lumber magnate E.J. Brickell; notary and bookkeeper J.J.L. Peel; hotel owner, judge, and *Truckee Republican* publisher John Keiser; hotel proprietor H.W. Roberts; and clothing store proprietor Frank Pauson. The citizens' committee that successfully negotiated with D.H. Haskell to obtain land for road construction had three members: Brickell, Roberts, and lawyer Charles Dunn. According to the 1870 census, Roberts owned $8000 in real estate, while Keiser owned $5000; property records show that Brickell was able to buy out a co-owner of Truckee Lumber Company in 1873, paying $50,000 for a half interest in the company. These property owners stood to lose much of their accumulated wealth if another conflagration burned down their homes and businesses.[26]

Undoubtedly, these residents' wealth and status were also crucial to the financial transactions necessary to remold the spatial relationships between Truckee's Chinese and white communities. The citizens' committee immediately raised $650 for a fund to buy out Chinese property owners with lots east of the projected road between East and West Main Street, which would eventually become Spring Street.[27]

The *Truckee Republican* opined confidently that Chinese residences and businesses could be confined to Chinatown, concluding that, "it is more than probable that they [Chinese] remove, since there is a determination on the part of our citizens not to have them there [outside Chinatown], and their will is frequently respected."[28] Strangely, however, only three weeks after the fire, records show that Toy Wong purchased a lot on East Main Street outside the supposed boundary of Chinatown. It appears that the business owners were able to fully implement their plan only in early 1876. On February 1, Loon Tong Chung gave Charles Crocker one dollar and his property lot on East Main Street in exchange for part of the lot situated immediately west of his former property. It seems likely, then, that the businessmen had arranged this exchange with the idea that Chinese stores would extend no further east than Loon Tong Chung's. We do not have records of the other Chinese businessmen who were made to sell their East Main Street property, but evidence suggests that some of those lots belonged to Toy Hong. Toy Hong made two purchases on the same day as Loon Tung Chung. Hong paid $50 for the eastern part of a lot on West Main Street that lay a few hundred feet west of the alley leading into Chinatown, and paid $25 for the lots immediately east of the same alley.[29]

Spring Street, also known as West Street (see Figure 2), connected the downtown area to High Street, which ran along the hill overlooking Chinatown. Beginning in the early 1870s, when this area was known as Prospect Hill, Truckee residents purchased property here to develop a second region, housing town business leaders; Spring Street was thus an important conduit between residential and commercial areas of Truckee, making High Street even more attractive. In this area, one could find the residences of Keiser, Hurd, Peel, general store owner Nelson Martin, clothier S.B. Weller, meat-market proprietor R. Paschen, mill owner James Vaughn, landlord William Hill, druggist G. Morrill, plus assorted brewers, merchants, engineers, and railroad conductors.[30]

The isolation of Chinese space and expansion of white space were linked processes, with Spring Street functioning to separate Chinese space from white space while simultaneously fostering the development of white space. By 1878, Truckee looked considerably different from four years earlier. Though Chinese still lived in cabins in the wooded areas around Truckee, and still worked as cooks alongside white and Black workers in hotels, Chinese-owned businesses and residences no longer settled into lots next to white owned properties. They were, on the whole, increasingly isolated and separated, while pushed closer together, even as white business owners built their homes on land they owned, often away from the physical spaces of business that they operated.

Chinese space became more and more uniform – with little geographic distinction between merchants, laborers, business, and home – while white space became more differentiated. None of this was the result of the earlier pattern of ethnic clustering that characterized Truckee in the first half of the 1870s, nor was it characterized by the malicious racism associated with the anti-Chinese boycott in the mid-1880s. Rather, it was the product of a very specific set of purposes executed by Truckee's white business owners, who sought to protect their property and wealth, which also turned ideas of racial difference into spatial distance.

The differences between white and Chinese spaces, in this climate, were projected back upon the Chinese themselves. In 1877, a journalist wrote in the *Truckee Republican*:

> Hoping to find something to offer in vindication of the much abused celestials, we turned our steps for a casual call upon the denizens who inhabit the filthy pens constructed above and a little back of our main row…Stores, gambling dens, tailor shops, bootmaking establishments, cigar and tobacco, opium and prostitution houses – each were visited and each were found as uncleanly and filthy as the preceding…From three to five of the miserable creatures (who are really to be pitied) were standing in each room, door, and porch…[31]

As the local economy reeled in the late 1870s from the depletion of the Comstock silver lode, reducing demand for lumber from Virginia City and other mining-centered towns, the racialization of space effected by Truckee's business owners converged with a growing animus toward Truckee's Chinese residents rooted in the white working class.

The business of relocation

In the fall of 1878, another fire ravaged Chinatown. This time white residents of Truckee insisted on the removal of the Chinese, and in early November a committee formed to purchase land from the CPRR on the Truckee River's south side. While Fong Lee notably objected to relocation, the citizen's committee was backed up by mob action. In late November, a mob of 500 people rallied by the town's Caucasian League rampaged through Chinatown, destroying houses and shops. Local vigilantes then hung red ribbons around town signaling, in local tradition, a warning that they would start deploying violence against Chinese unless they left.[32]

The group charged with overseeing the removal and relocation named themselves the South Truckee Association. There were four members: E.J. Brickell, Frederick Burckhalter, Joseph Gray, and Joseph Moody. A fifth individual, J.J.L. Peel, served as the group's treasurer. The four members were among Truckee's most notable capitalists: Gray and Brickell owned some of its most important lumber companies, Moody was a famous hotelier, while Fredrick "Frank" Burckhalter owned a goods store and operated Truckee's first bank. Thus, three of the four – Brickell, Gray, and Moody – had earned their wealth in industries dependent upon Chinese workers (Burckhalter would pass away in 1880). With these men at the helm, the South Truckee Association represented the confluence of racial paternalism and business-like earnestness.[33] The stated purpose of the association was to acquire property in Old and New Chinatown, the latter designated as South Truckee, "the object especially being to remove the Chinamen from Old China Town, in Truckee, to South Truckee, the better to protect the property of the white population from fires, and to save the Chinese population from violence, on the part of disaffected whites." Protecting white property and saving Chinese lives, while turning an honest profit: this was the business of relocation.[34]

There must have been, undoubtedly, a genuine fear of violence among the Chinese population. According to Jean Pfaelzer, some residents of Chinatown even sought to arm themselves in expectation of mob violence. However, it was unclear that the Truckee River would protect the Chinese community from white violence. The most famous incident of anti-Chinese violence in Truckee was the Trout Creek Outrage, in which a group of white residents traveled to woodchopper cabins on Truckee's outskirts. There, the group of whites set fire to the Chinese workers' cabins and fired upon them as they fled, killing one. Although there was a trial for one of the murderers, no one was ever convicted. The fact that the group traveled away from Truckee, where there would be fewer possibilities for whites to witness their crime, suggests that physical distance did not diminish the risk of violence. In fact, the physical separation from white Truckee might have made Chinatown more vulnerable to fire damage. Since the fates of their respective dwellings were no longer linked, white residents might react to a fire in the new Chinatown with indifference. This is exactly what happened in an 1883 fire when, as reported in the *Truckee Republican*, "a small hoodlum element was present at the Chinatown fire and took occasion to snowball and otherwise pester the unfortunate men who were trying to save their property." Half of Chinatown burned down. The association's racial paternalism was thus more a concession to racial animus than an effective shield for the Chinese against that animus.[35]

The clearest picture we have of the financial transactions involved in the relocation of Chinatown come from the South Truckee Association's cash book. From December 1878 until April 1884, the group tracked most of its financial dealings. In March 1879, the group


Truckee River
700
400
A
B
C
D
E
F
Block of Land deeded to E J Brickell
Jno F Moody, Joseph Gray and F
Burckhalter March 26th 1879 by
Charles Crocker
"Commencing at a point 623 feet South westerly
"from Station 772 on C.P.R.R. measured at
"right angles with the line of said Rail Road
"running thence Easterly 700 feet thence at
"right angles to the right 400 feet, thence at
"right angles to the right 700 ft thence at right
"angles to the right 400 feet to the point of
"beginning
(Description Copied from deed)
South
New Chinatown or South Truckee
Lots 25 front by 70 feet back
Scale 100 to inch
North

Figure 3. A map of lots in Truckee's "New Chinatown." From the South Truckee association ledger, Joseph Gray research cabin, Truckee-Donner historical society. Photo taken by Jerry Blackwill.

paid $600 to Charles Crocker for a 700-feet-by-400-feet plot of land south of the Truckee River. They divided a section of this property into 38 lots measuring 25 feet wide by 70 feet deep, which were then sold or rented to Chinese residents (see Figure 3).

The book lists nine individuals or companies who purchased lots in New Chinatown as of January 23, 1880. Ah Mou, who may have been the individual who lost $1000 in the 1875 fire, purchased half of a lot. Ah Liu, Ah Long, Yuen Cheung Jau, Hoong Hang Ou, Yeh Fong, two individuals named Ah Chuck, and the Quong Sing Lung Company all purchased property. The Quong Sing Lung Company actually purchased four adjacent lots for a 7000-square-foot store, while Ah Chuck and Ah Liu also purchased properties larger than a single lot.[36]

An entry on July 11, 1880 lists figures that were likely the prices of these lots. It appears that the association priced the lots at $25 each, with each Chinese buyer paying a proportional amount. The total value of the 38 lots initially owned by the association was thus $950, a 50% increase over what the association had itself spent to acquire them. The total sales accounted for on July 11 amounted to $162 dollars, plus another $100 the Quong Sing Lung Company had paid for its four lots earlier in the year.[37]

The South Truckee Association also acquired lots in Old Chinatown. The most detailed transaction recorded in their ledger occurred on February 4, 1879. The association purchased property from Wah Lee for $166.50, with each member of the association acquiring a one-quarter interest in the property. Wah Lee then paid much of that money back to the Association and its members, purchasing $40.65 of lumber from Brickell, as well as paying Burckhalter $83.94 and Joseph Gray $14.78 for unspecified goods or services. D.J. Crowley received $5 for drawing the deed, and the remainder – $22.13 – went to the South Truckee Association Treasury, presumably for the purchase of a lot in New Chinatown.[38]

Besides revenue from property sales, the Association had two other revenue streams: rents and water utilities. Rents would have accrued from the many properties the association owned in New Chinatown, where over 200 Chinese lived at the time of the 1880 census. But the association would have also had access to rents from unsold properties in Old Chinatown, which had suddenly become unused land close to the heart of Truckee. The association also collected rent on at least one occasion from Chinese boarding in the local hotels during the relocation process. Until 1883, when the Chinese merchants paid $600 to Brickell, Gray, and Moody for a spring that ran south of their new residences, the association also took in up to $40 per month for payments to the water works it established.[39]

The association did not record a final accounting of revenues versus expenses, and it is not always clear whether a given transaction in the association's ledger is an expense or income. Yet, by April 1884, the association had accumulated $3317.69 in its dividend account, payable in equal shares to the association's four members (presumably, Fredrick Burckhalter's share passed to his son William). The authors calculate the expenses to be roughly $2600, leading to a figure of $700 in profit for relocating the Chinese community.[40]

Even though many of these expenses were paid to the businesses of the four association members, the revenue numbers are not very large compared to the accumulated wealth of Brickell, Gray, Moody, and Burckhalter. In other words, it seems unlikely that the four capitalists' primary motivation in forming the Association was to exploit the vulnerable bargaining position of the Chinese residents for economic gain. The price of land in New Chinatown was designed to return a profit to the association, but it was not exorbitant and the profits themselves were modest compared to the capitalists' business revenues.[41]

Although these financial transactions were not highly significant for the association members, they looked quite different from the perspective of the Chinese. For them, the business of relocation was costly. At the beginning of February 1879, Wah Lee had property worth at least $166.50 covering an area of 2200 square feet in the heart of Truckee. At the end of the month, he held a property worth less than $23 covering less than 1750 square feet. For all of the Chinese business owners, relocation must have entailed a loss of real estate wealth; for example, it is unclear whether Fong Lee ever was able to rebuild a brick store in South Truckee. By contrast, the Association members came into ownership of a set of rent-generating properties in both New and Old Chinatown. In 1890, after most of the Chinese had been driven out, ownership of the unsold properties in Old Chinatown passed to Josephy Gray, goods and clothing store owner J.L. Lewison, and the main advocate of the anti-Chinese boycott, *Truckee Republican* editor Charles McGlashan. They continued to derive income from rents and sales of these properties until the ledger stopped recording transactions in 1899.[42]

The physical relocation of Chinatown, coupled with the general economic malaise affecting Truckee in the late 1870s, deeply changed the population and drained the wealth of the Chinese community. In the 1880 census, there are no gardeners listed. One resident is recorded as a launderer, and another as a washman, a precipitous decline from the 21 washmen listed in the 1870 census, and who lived in all the various regions of Truckee. In 1880, there are no listings of Chinese grocers, but there are listings for merchants (3), fruit or fish peddlers (2), and butchers (2). Other listed occupations were new as well. Teamsters (8), mill laborers (24), bookkeeper (1), servants, agents, and helpers (all 2) appear for the first time next to Chinese names in the 1880 census. Overall, however, the census depicts a much smaller group of Chinese proprietors and documents a significant destruction of Chinese wealth during the time period when the community had experienced multiple displacements.[43]

Some Chinese cooks still lived with white households, but in a change that seems to represent the community's shifting relationship to the town of Truckee, none represented themselves with Anglicized names such as Ah Sam, Ah John, Ah Jim, Ah Sam, Ah Saul, or Ah Dick, all of which appeared in the 1870 census. An even larger number of Chinese were listed as woodchoppers in 1880 – 137 as opposed to 71 a decade earlier – while the number of railroad workers declined from 76 to 27. As noted above, a significant number worked as mill laborers and a small number, 14, were listed simply as laborer.[44]

Even after the ordeal of coerced relocation, Chinese residents sought to create their own institutions. In May 1883, the Yeck Yu company, comprised of Truckee's Chinese shop owners, purchased seven acres of land and a spring that would allow them to build a water system. They paid $600 to Gray, Moody, and Brickell – the same price that the white business owners had paid for all the land upon which New Chinatown was situated. By 1883, one resident of Truckee, Charles Wade, was employed as the "watchman Chinatown." It is not clear whether Wade was preventing arsonists from entering Chinatown, as they had done in early 1883, burning down half of its buildings, or if Wade was supposed to prevent Chinese from attempting to reclaim space in Truckee proper. What is clearer, though, is that a physical division, crossable only by bridge or ferry, now embodied the difference between Chinese and white spaces for Truckee residents. And that division was being policed.[45]

Conclusion

After the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad, fledgling towns such as Truckee gained economic vitality from the Chinese who left the railroads to engage in urban commerce and establish long-term residences, joining those who had departed from the silver mines. The systematic expulsion of Chinese residents from Truckee's central spaces eroded the economic gains made by the Chinese after that transition and rewove the town's social fabric. It halted a pattern of development in which Chinese businesses and residences were sometimes situated next to white businesses and residences. Our study demonstrates the complex process whereby this happened in the 1870s: how notions of the flammability of Chinese buildings became ideas about the necessity of isolating Chinese and white spaces, which then impelled the construction of physical boundaries intended to separate those spaces. That separation intensified during the second half of the decade, as the Chinese were forced to relocate across the Truckee River. Crucial to this racialization of space were leading members of Truckee's professional and propertied class, especially those employers of Chinese labor who tended to adopt an attitude of racial paternalism rather than racial animus.

The Truckee Method boycott that convulsed the town in 1885 and 1886 marked another shift in race relations. The boycott campaign was dominated by white workers' concerns about competition from Chinese workers, expressed as racial animus, and targeted the white capitalists examined above. The Truckee Method drove out nearly all the town's Chinese residents. Unlike the businessmen that comprised the South Truckee Association, the working-class residents who saw Chinese workers as threatening competition derived little satisfaction – and no profit – from the presence of Truckee's Chinese community. Where segregation and relocation had reconfigured the relationship between Chinese space and white space, expulsion obviously severed the relationship entirely. But from the perspective of this study, the Truckee Method also repeated many facets of the earlier, business-led racialization of space in Truckee, especially the reliance on economic coordination alleged to forestall anti-Chinese violence and the belief that ever-escalating processes of racial isolation would protect white interests. Indeed, the illogical leap leading white residents from their fear of economic competition toward the embrace of total expulsion of Chinese residents from all of Truckee reflected the fundamental assumptions behind the racialization of space in the 1870s.

Notes

1. W.F. Edwards, *Tourists' Guide and Directory of the Truckee Basin* (Truckee, CA: Republican Job Print, 1883): 17–20.
2. Ibid., 20.
3. Ibid., 118.
4. Studies of Truckee's Chinese community include Michael Andrew Goldstein, "Truckee's Chinese Community: From Coexistence to Disintegration, 1870–1890" (master's thesis, UCLA, 1988); Wallace Hagaman, with Steve Cottrell, *The Chinese Must Go!: The Anti-Chinese Boycott of Truckee, California – 1886* (Nevada City, CA: The Cowboy Press, 2004); Jean Pfaelzer, *Driven Out: The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans* (New York: Random House, 2007); Sue Fawn Chung, *Chinese in the Woods: Logging and Lumbering in the American West* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015). On anti-Chinese violence more generally, see Beth Lew-Williams, *The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). Of the many studies of Asian racialization and space, especially relevant is Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). On race and space in rural Chinese American communities, see Sucheng Chan, *This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture*, 1860–1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); on the racial geography of mining towns, see Sue Fawn Chung, *In Pursuit of Gold: Chinese American Miners and Merchants in the American West* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011).
5. Goldstein, "Truckee's Chinese Community,"12; see also the works cited in the previous note. Recent works theorizing the relationship between class and Asian racialization include Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893–1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Iyko Day, *Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).
6. Chung, *Chinese in the Woods*, 124; Gordon H. Chang and Shelley Fisher Fishkin, eds., with Hilton Obenzinger and Roland Hsu, *The Chinese and the Iron Road: Building the Transcontinental Railroad in North America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019). See also the description of Chinese labor by Charles Crocker in *Statement Made to the President of the United States, and Secretary of the Interior, of the Progress of the Work, October 10th, 1865* (Sacramento, CA: H.S. Crocker and Co., 1865): 7.
7. Output numbers in Chung, *Chinese in the Woods*, 114–5; see also Dick Wilson, *Sawdust Trails in the Truckee Basin: A History of Lumbering Operations, 1856–1936* (Nevada City, CA: Nevada County Historical Society, 1992): 65–82.
8. For descriptions of the various neighborhoods of Truckee, see Paul A. Lord, Jr., ed. *Fire and Ice: A Portrait of Truckee* (Truckee, CA: Truckee-Donner Historical Society, 1981); on the location of Chinatown, see Marilou West Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records, 3rd edition* (Grass Valley, CA: Marilou West Ficklin, 2003), especially Appendix C. Page numbers for Ficklin's

volume list the chapter or appendix first, then the page number within that section: for instance, Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–5 refers to page 5 in chapter 3.

9. U.S. Census of Population, 1870, for Meadow Lake, Nevada County, CA, U.S. Census Bureau, referred to hereafter as 1870 U.S. Census; all census rolls were accessed through ancestry.com; Ficklin, appendices C and E.
10. 1870 U.S. Census; Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–19; for an analysis of the average number of laborers per dwelling, see Goldstein, "Truckee's Chinese Community,"15–16.
11. Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–1. Ficklin believes that Baldwin and the wash house may have been in lots south of Main Street, where it met Front Street at an angle. We disagree. We agree with Ficklin that Baldwin's lot is likely the same as the one occupied by Expectation Salas, but that lot is listed as bordered on the south by the "wagon road" (Main Street). See *Property Ownership By Lot and Block, Early Truckee Records*, accessed on July 18, 2018: http://www.westerly-journeys.com/Truckee/data_top.html.
12. 1870 U.S. Census; Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 4–3, 4–10.
13. 1870 U.S. Census. For property records of Frances Aud, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–1.
14. The wash house is listed near to residences of Joseph Gray, Michael Borowsky, and J.J.L. Peel. For the locations of these residences, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, B–1, 4–1, and 4–12. Ah Jing's and Ah Ying's names occur in the census shortly after a long list of names of laborers, but those names were enumerated on an earlier day. See 1870 U.S. Census. On Chinese laundries' relationship to white and Chinese spaces, see D. Michael Bottoms, *An Aristocracy of Color: Race and Reconstruction in California and the West, 1850–1890* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013): chapter 4; Mary Ting Yi Lui, *The Chinatown Trunk Mystery: Murder, Miscegenation, and Other Dangerous Encounters in Turn-of-the-Century New York City* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005): chapter 2.
15. 1870 U.S. Census; on the China Garden, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, C–1.
16. Wilson, *Sawdust Trails in the Truckee Basin*, 66, 77, 78; Chung, *Chinese in the Woods*, 115–6.
17. Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, chapter 4.
18. Ibid., chapters 3 and 4.
19. Paul Goodman, "The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840–1880," *Journal of American History* 80, no. 2 (September 1993): 470–98; quote on 487. See also *The Statutes of California*, Second Session of the Legislature, 1851: 296–8. The 1851 statute does not restrict homestead declarations to white residents of California, but the 1860 revision to the statute, which extends the benefit to unmarried individuals, specified that homestead declarations could only be made by white men or women. See *The Statutes of California*, Eleventh Session of the Legislature, 1860: 87–9. There are several records of homestead declarations by white residents of Truckee, but none by Chinese individuals or married couples. See Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, chapter 3. After the Chinese were relocated across the Truckee River, hotel owner J.F. Moody declared a homestead on their former property to prevent them from returning. See Joanne Meschery, *Truckee: An Illustrated History of the Town and Its Surroundings* (Truckee, CA: Rocking Stone Press, 1978): 73. On the Murray Pembroke legal action against Fong Lee, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–16.
20. "Lucky Truckee," *Truckee Republican* (May 29, 1875). According to the article, white owners that suffered losses included Sam Lore ($1,800), B. Caruthers ($400), Grazen and Stoll ($1,000), Paschen and Kirby ($300), and Sisson, Wallace, and Co. ($1,500).
21. "Up and Doing," *Truckee Republican* (May 29, 1875); "The New Chinatown," *Truckee Republican* (June 2, 1875).
22. "The New Chinatown."
23. Bottoms, *An Aristocracy of Color*, 161.
24. Edwards, *Tourists' Guide*, 19; Lord, Jr., *Fire and Ice*, 12. For the Chinatown in Truckee and other California towns, arson accounts for a non-trivial amount of fire damage. An August 20, 1874 article in the *Sacramento Union* ("More incendiarism") observed, "There seems to be a deliberate, persistent attempt on the part of one or more individuals to burn

Chinatown." Other locales that saw arson attempts on their Chinatowns during this period include Antioch and Chico. See H. Brett Melendy, *The Oriental Americans* (New York: Twayne, 1972), 37–8.

25. "Report of the Citizens' Committee," *Truckee Republican* (June 5, 1875).
26. Occupation information can be found in Edwards, *Tourists' Guide*, 122–37; for wealth figures for Roberts and Keiser, see 1870 U.S. Census; U.S. Census of Population, 1880, for Truckee, Nevada County, CA, U.S. Census Bureau, referred to hereafter as 1880 U.S. Census; for Brickell's purchase of Truckee Lumber Company's half-interest, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–3. More information about property ownership can be found in Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, Chapters 3 and 4.
27. "Report from the Citizens' Committee."
28. Ibid.
29. Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, C–1, 3–5, 3–10, 3–22; Loon Tung Chung is probably the Loon, Tang, Cheong and Company mentioned in Chung, *Chinese in the Woods*, 110.
30. 1880 U.S. Census.
31. *Truckee Republican* (November 14 1877), quoted in Meschery, *Truckee*, 72.
32. Pfaelzer, *Driven Out*, 176; Chung, *Chinese in the Woods*, 120; Ficklin, appendix C. Our chronology differs somewhat from Pfalezer, who places the 601's threat before the mob action. Ficklin's chronology seems more credible based on the date of the *Truckee Republican* article about the 601's threats, on November 28 1878. For the purchase of the land south of Truckee River, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–2.
33. For Gray and Brickell, see Wilson, *Sawdust Trails in the Truckee Basin*, 66, 70, and note 42 below; on Burckhalter, see U.S. Census of Population, 1870, and "A Historical Walk Down Truckee's 'Whiskey Row'," *Sierra Sun*, January 8 2003, accessed online on July 11 2018 at: https://www.sierrasun.com/news/opinion/a-historical-walk-down-truckees-whiskey-row/.
34. South Truckee Association ledger, Joseph Gray Research Cabin, Truckee-Donner Historical Society. The authors wish to thank Jerry Blackwill for locating this document.
35. On the Trout Creek massacre and reports of Chinese arming themselves, see Jean Pfaelzer, *Driven Out*, 171–4, 183. The *Truckee Republican* is quoted in Meschery, *Truckee*, 73.
36. South Truckee Association ledger, 126.
37. Ibid., 9.
38. Ibid., 3. A lot with Wah Lee's name appears on the ledger's map of New Chinatown. It is slightly smaller than the 25‘ x 70' lot, which accords with a price of $22.13.
39. On Chinese rent from hotels, see South Truckee Association ledger, 7. Rent and water revenues are recorded throughout the ledger. On the purchase of the spring south of the New Chinatown, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–22.
40. For the dividend account, see South Truckee Association ledger, 12.
41. See note 27 above regarding the worth of Brickell's interest in Truckee Lumber company. The 1870 census does not list figures for Joseph Gray's assets, but Wilson describes his mill as producing 30,000 ft of lumber daily from 1872–1880: see Wilson, *Sawdust Trails in the Truckee Basin*, 70. Gray also purchased a hotel in 1875 for $7,000; Moody purchased a hotel in 1870 for $11,500: see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–9, 3–16. Some entries in the ledger suggest that local hoteliers may have received a subsidy from the association for providing board for Chinese during the relocation. See South Truckee Association ledger, 1–2.
42. For Wah Lee transaction, see South Truckee Association ledger, 3, and Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–9. A comparison with real estate advertisements in the May and June issues of the *Truckee Republican* suggests that Wah Lee's property in Old Chinatown was likely worth more than $166.50. For Gray, Lewison, and McGlashan rentier income, see South Truckee Association ledger, 13–15.
43. 1870 U.S. Census; 1880 U.S. Census. The decline in Chinese proprietorship seems particularly severe when compared to the fortunes of Truckee's white residents, hence our conclusion that the dislocations had an impact over and above that of the recession. Our figures differ somewhat from those of Goldstein, which were used by Chung. Based on our examination

of the census rolls, Goldstein apparently included census data from the nearby towns of Cisco and Boca in his 1870 numbers.

44. The extent to which the relocation of Chinatown affected daily social interactions between white and Chinese residents of Truckee remains to be fully explored. On the complicated ways that the apparent color-line dividing white and Chinese Californians was both crossed and maintained, and a comparison to the color-line of the Jim Crow South, see Beth Lew-Williams, "'Chinamen' and 'Delinquent Girls': Intimacy, Exclusion, and a Search for California's Color Line," *Journal of American History* 104, no. 3 (December 2017): 632–55.
45. On Yeck Yu company, see Ficklin, *Early Truckee Records*, 3–22; on Charles Wade, see Edwards, *Tourists' Guide*, 136.

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